Shipbucket

Royal Iraqi Air Force

The Iraqi air force was founded in early 1931 with British trained Iraqi pilots and equipped with de Havilland DH.60G Gypsy Moths. The RIrAF saw action against Kurdish rebels that same year, and gradually increased strength with more de Havilland types and also Hawker Audax fighters. By 1937 the RIrAF had reached a level of maturity and sought to expand further. The Iraqis ordered Gloster Gladiators from Britain, but also formed a relationship with Italy and purchased Savoia-Marchetti SM.79 twin-engined bombers and Breda Ba.65 light bombers, and in 1939 purchased Douglas 8A-4 dive bombers from the US.



With increasing anti-British sentiment the Italian presence in Iraqi air force affairs was increasingly fostered. As Italy saw their intentions in the Balkans being hampered by Britain, more Italian resources were turned towards attempting to destabilise the British position in the Middle East. With the fall of Yugoslavia Italy had captured a supply of modern combat aircraft, and had placed those aircraft into storage rather than transferring them to the new Croat State. Now Italy was able to offer these to the Iraqis with a training and support mission.
Transferring the aircraft to Iraq was in itself not a simple matter, as overflight and transit rights through the British and French Mandates were not on the cards, and so Italy had to negotiate with Turkey to allow the use of its territory and facilities. By the beginning of June the first aircraft arrived and added to a growing sense of Iraqi nationalism.



Italy was deliberately only supplying non-Italian aircraft, and made claim to just be disposing of unwanted war prizes rather than assisting Iraq prepare for war. But the motives were transparent and were concerning to the British authorities. But more insidious and not as readily apparent were Italian agent-provocateurs also inserted into the region, to stir up anti-British sentiment and energise anti-British groups in Iraq as well as Kuwait and Iran.

The Italians selling captured Bf-109E-3a to Iraq - did the Germans allow it?

British Forces In Iraq

With the frugal times of the 1920’s Britain sought to police the Empire by air as a cheaper alternative to having large land forces, and so the British presence in Mesopotamia was placed under the control of the RAF. Using the model adopted in the Sudan, the RAF conducted policing by air over the unruly tribes of the Mesopotamian hinterland. With the independence of Iraq in 1932 the British military presence was restricted to two RAF stations; the large training station of RAF Habbaniya west of Baghdad, and the sleepy RAF Shaibah near Basra.
RAF Habbaniya was a massive facility, being also the seat of British power in Iraq, and held within itself a civilian town of 10,000 people being the families of the Iraqi Levy units. The lake alongside the base was even the Imperial Airways staging post for the Empire flying boats, the only suitable spot in the Mesopotamian desert. But for all that in mid 1941 RAF Habbaniya was an aircrew flight training station with only 80 aircraft and 35 pilots. The most modern machines were a single Bristol Blenheim bomber and nine Gloster Gladiator fighters, the remainder being obsolete Hawker Audax and Airspeed Oxford trainers, Fairey Gordon target tugs, and Vickers Valencia transports. Ground forces appeared more significant, with 1000 British support staff, 1200 Iraqi and Assyrian Levies, and 18 RAF armoured cars. However even the armoured cars were obsolete, the vehicles having been in service in the Middle East since 1915.
RAF Shaibah on the other hand was little more than a desert airstrip. It’s only resident unit was 244 Squadron flying the outdated Vickers Vincent, who had been repositioned in November 1940 from Habbaniya to replace the Blenheim Mk.I’s of 84 Squadron who had themselves been sent to reinforce Britain’s position in Greece.



Considering the importance of Iraq for traffic between Britain and its eastern possessions, and its oil to the functioning of the Empire, Britain had neglected their forces in the region.

A stronger Iraqi rebelion vs a stronger British response - how long will this war takes...

Operation Sabine

After the coup Iraq’s new Prime Minister Rashid Ali reaffirmed to the British ambassador that the new government would continue to honour the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. However this assurance was not accepted at face value by the Foreign Office, and the ambassador was immediately withdrawn to be replaced by Kinahan Cornwallis, who having spent 20 years as the adviser to former King Faisal I, was considered to be more able to take a forceful position to the new Iraqi regime. At RAF Habbaniya Air Vice Marshal Harry Smart, the Air Officer Commanding, was also wary of the new government’s position and requested reinforcements, particularly modern aircraft. Still believing the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty to be effective London rejected this, and instead counselled diplomacy, although by the 8th July Operation Sabine was initiated and Indian troops that been destined for deployment to Malaya were redirected to Iraq.
At RAF Habbaniya the instructors of 4 Flying Training School started to prepare both the base and their aircraft for the possibility of combat operations. Against official directions 12 Hawker Audax trainers were fitted with Hawker Hart bomb racks, while another 9 were able to be fitted with the smaller Audax standard racks. Additionally the 27 Airspeed Oxford I’s were modified to carry bombs semi-internally. While the base itself was surrounded by perimeter fencing, the runways were outside the wire and exposed. The golf course and polo pitch, which were inside the perimeter, were rolled flat to provide secure overnight dispersal and a small relief landing field.
On the 12th July troopships carrying the 10th Indian Infantry Division and the Royal Artillery's 3rd Field Regiment, without their guns, departed from Karachi. The troopships were supported by Royal Naval vessels including the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes, who were tasked to support the disembarkation of the troops at Basra in the event that their landing was to be opposed by Iraqi forces.
The Iraqi government was advised that Britain would be transiting troops through the country enroute to Mandatory Palestine – even though their real intention was to reinforce the two British Iraqi bases – on the 16th July, and expressed no objections.
Over the 17th and 18th July the 1st Battalion King's Own Royal Regiment was airlifted into RAF Shaibah from Karachi on Armstrong Whitworth A.W.XV Atalanta, Douglas DC-2 and Vickers Valentia transports. The KORR were tasked to provide defensive support to the arriving convoy in the event of Iraqi resistance, but the Iraqis choose to not oppose the landings and over the 18th and 19th the Indian troops were disembarked at Basra. Positioning themselves to secure the port, power station and airfield it became rapidly apparent that the new arrivals were remaining in rather than transiting through Iraq, and on the 21st Rashid Ali declared this a violation of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and forbade any further reinforcements.



On the 23rd June the British ambassador advised Rashid Ali that another convoy was inbound with additional troops, and was in turn advised that Iraq would consider that their disembarkation would be an act of war. On the 29th July three troopships carrying the remaining elements of the 20th Infantry Brigade docked at Basra. Reading the escalating tension, the British ambassador issued an advice to British civilians in Baghdad to leave the city and opened the gates of RAF Habbaniya to them. As transport flights now brought the KORR to reinforce the base, the civilians were flown south to Basra.



Although the disembarkation of the remaining Indians troops was unopposed in Basra, in Baghdad Iraqi troops were mobilised.

Nice progress.

Nice paint job on the DC-2

Iraqi Escalation

The arrival of the second British troop convoy was the final straw for Baghdad, and movement orders were sent to Iraqi military units on the afternoon of the 29th. At 3am the British embassy in Baghdad advised RAF Habbaniya that Iraqi troops had left their bases in Baghdad en masse and were headed west. Before dawn they had established themselves on the plateau that dominated the whole of the south of the RAF base. The British armoured cars that had been maintaining a watchpost on the plateau withdrew back to the base, and before dawn reconnaissance aircraft reported that at least two battalions, with artillery, had taken up positions on the plateau.
At 6am, an Iraqi representative presented a message to the Air Officer Commanding, stating that the plateau had been occupied for a training exercise. The envoy also passed a demand that all flying should cease immediately and no movements, either ground or air, take place from the base. Conferring with the British ambassador in Baghdad, Air Vice Marshal Harry Smart replied instead that any interference with the normal training carried out at the base would be treated as an act of war. British reconnaissance aircraft continued to relay information to the base; reporting that the Iraqi positions on the plateau were being steadily reinforced, and that Iraqi troops had occupied the town of Fallujah to the east of RAF Habbaniya.
At 11:30 the Iraqi envoy again made contact and accused the British of violating the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. Air Vice Marshal Smart replied that this was a political matter and he would have to refer the accusation to Ambassador Cornwallis. Meanwhile, Iraqi forces had now occupied the bridges over the Tigris and Euphrates rivers as well as reinforcing their garrison at Ramadi to the west of the base, thus effectively cutting off RAF Habbaniya except from the air.
Further exchanges of messages took place between the British and Iraqi forces but none were able to deescalate the situation. The AOC again cabled London to request reinforcements, and in response 18 70 Squadron Wellington bombers were redeployed from Egypt to RAF Shaibah. The British Ambassador advised London that he considered the Iraqi actions as an act of war, which required an immediate air response. He also requested permission to launch air strikes to restore British control.
Later in the day the Iraqi forces on the plateau overlooking RAF Habbaniya had grown to an infantry brigade, two mechanized battalions, a mechanized artillery brigade with 12 howitzers, a field artillery brigade with 12 cannons and four 4 howitzers, 12 armoured cars, Fiat light tanks, a mechanised machine gun company, a signals company, and a mixed battery of anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns. This totalled 9,000 regular troops along with tribal irregulars and about 50 guns.

British Preparations For Battle

The British position at RAF Habbaniya was perilous at best. Against the massed Iraqi forces were the 390 men of the KORR, 1200 local Levies and 18 armoured cars. The bulk of the British army in Iraq was in Basra, 600 kms to the southeast, but even then the roads around the Mesopotamian Marshes were in poor condition due to seasonal flooding and so they were unable to provide rapid assistance.
The Iraqis spent the 31st July consolidating their position, while cables bounced back and forwards between the British Consulate in Baghdad, RAF Habbaniya and London. In the afternoon the instruction came through giving Ambassador Cornwallis full authority to take any steps needed to ensure the withdrawal of the Iraqi armed forces. PM Halifax included a personal note, stating: "If you have to strike, strike hard. Use all necessary force." In the event that communications broke down with RAF Habbaniya, the AOC was given permission to act on his own authority.
Air Vice-Marshal Smart, with the full support of the Ambassador, decided to launch air strikes against the Iraqi troops on the plateau the following morning without issuing an ultimatum, fearing the Iraqis would mount their own pre-emptive attack on the base if forewarned. At 8 pm the orders were issued for an air attack timed for 5 am the following morning, with the aircraft of RAF Habbaniya being supplemented by Wellington bombers from RAF Shaibah.

Dawn Attack

In the predawn darkness of the 1st August, the hastily armed Hawker and Oxford trainers became airborne, and at 5 am began to bomb the massed Iraqis on the plateau. Taken by surprise the Iraqis soon responded with artillery fire on the base. In the low light of dawn, the muzzle flashes of the Iraqi guns highlighted their positions and attracted the attention of the RAF bombers.



With daylight 8 Wellington bombers from RAF Shaibah arrived overhead, and joined the action over the plateau and added their bombloads and turret gunfire to the fray. In a combat area barely the size of a golf course more than 40 British aircraft engaged in uncoordinated attacks from random altitudes on the Iraqis below.
The attack was by no means a one-sided action, as Iraqi gunners were able to shoot down and damage many British aircraft. The larger Wellington’s were particularly effected, with all 8 aircraft thrown into the initial raid being rendered unserviceable, one Wellington making a forced landing onto the main runway at RAF Habbaniya.
With the runway being outside the perimeter fence, the airfield itself was in a no man’s land, fully exposed to Iraqi guns. The task of recovering the crippled Wellington and its crew was given No.3 Section of the RAF’s No.1 Armoured Car Company. Three Rolls Royce Armoured cars provided protection to the towing tractor brought out to attempt to haul the damaged bomber clear of the runway and into shelter within the base. In full sight of the Iraqis the rescue party drew heavy fire, and the tractor was hit and destroyed in flames, dooming the Wellington to itself being destroyed on the runway. The flight crew were scooped into the armoured cars under fire, but the armoured cars were still in action. Iraqi Crossley armoured cars swooped down on the stricken bomber but were repulsed without lose to either side.



The British aircraft were increasingly forced to use the golf course and polo pitch for flight operations as the main runway and hangars were taking an increasing amount of gunfire, while the depths of the base were shielded from sight and relatively safer. The converted trainers were fortunately small enough aircraft to cope with the very reduced operational areas available inside the base, and mounted a continuous attack on the Iraqi positions over the day, pausing only to refuel and rearm before launching again.