FLUFF: WHY DO THEY USE BI-PLANES?
Because Bi-planes have good lift characteristics generally, and because with planes taking off from ships, the designers have to be conservative. No forward control canard winged or pusher propeller designs or even monoplanes, unless seriously proven, need apply. Besides, the biplanes have smaller footprints and take up less deck and hanger space. They are easier to trice in a hanger. And they can carry heavier bombloads for the underpowered engines available.
The period is called Mister Hoover's Navy after all. I selected it for very good reasons. The impetus was the original thread elsewhere in this forum of an Anconia type seaplane tender conversion of the Wiesbaden by the Kriegsmarine matched with the 1926 publication of Hector C. Bywater's speculations about a Japanese American war in the Pacific.
The Mackensen as an aircraft tender was always going to be nonsense. The Germans know as much about aircraft carriers in 1916 as the fictional man in the moon. If a German battlecruiser is going to become an aircraft carrier, it will have to be the Americans who convert a war prize to do it. The only candidates that fit the bill will be the Derfflinger and the Moiltke. These are the only German ships long enough, wide enough and fast enough to meet the the known wind over deck requirements to get a navalized Nieuport off the deck without a catapult.
Things do not just happen by a snap of the fingers. Thoughts, plans, and experimentation before hull metal is fitted together, must be enjoined. This is especially true for aircraft.
Let us look at the state of the art, ten years after WW I For the USA in its fighter line, that is the F4B (P12). It is a biplane.
Specifications (P-12E) (F4B-1)
Data from Bowers 1989
General characteristics
Crew: one
Length: 20 ft 4 in (6.19 m)
Wingspan: 30 ft (9.14 m)
Height: 9 ft (2.74 m)
Loaded weight: 2,690 lb (1,220 kg)
Powerplant: 1 × Pratt & Whitney R-1340-17 Radial engine, 500 hp (373 kW)
Performance
Maximum speed: 189 mph (304 km/h)
Cruise speed: 160 mph (257 km/h)
Range: 570 miles (917 km)
Service ceiling: 8,020 m (26,300 ft)
Normal ceiling: 3,048 m (10,000 ft)
Armament
Guns: 2 x .30 inch (7.62 mm) Browning machine guns with 600 rounds per gun or 1 x .30 inch (7.62 mm) machine gun with 600 rounds and 1 x .50 inch (12.7 mm) machine gun with 200 rounds
Bombs: 244 lb (111 kg) of bombs carried externally.
The Japanese machines are identical but are only in an evaluation hokutai (squadron) at Sasebo. They are trying (and will succeed in building copies), but at the moment, the Japanese are borrowing British ideas and foreign equipment, so their likely top of the fighter flight line is this:
Specifications (A2N1)
Data from Japanese Aircraft, 1910-1941; The Complete Book of Fighters
General characteristics
Crew: 1
Length: 6.18 m (20 ft 3⅜ in)
Wingspan: 9.37 m (30 ft 9 in)
Height: 3.20 m (9 ft 11 in)
Wing area: 19.74 m² (212.5 ft²)
Empty weight: 1,045 kg (2,304 lb)
Loaded weight: 1,550 kg (3,417 lb)
Powerplant: 1 × Nakajima Kotobuki 2 nine cylinder air-cooled radial engine, 433 kW (580 hp)
Performance
Maximum speed: 293 km/h (158 knots, 182 mph) at 3,000 m (9,845 ft)
Cruise speed: 166 km/h (90 knots, 103.6 mph)
Range: 501 km (270 nmi, 311 mi)
Service ceiling: 9,000 m (29,500 ft)
Normal ceiling: 3,048 m (10,000 ft)
Wing loading: 78.5 kg/m² (16.1 lb/ft²)
Endurance: 3 hours
Climb to 3,000 m (9,845 ft): 5.75 min
Armament
Guns: 2× 7.7 mm (0.303 in) Type 97 machine guns
If that sounds like a Boeing F2B clone, congratulations. It is.
Just to give you an idea of what the British do; this is the Hawker Hart:
Specifications Hart (Kestrel IB powered day bomber)
Data from The British Bomber since 1914.
General characteristics
Crew: 2
Length: 29 ft 4 in (8.94 m)
Wingspan: 37 ft 3 in (11.36 m)
Height: 10 ft 5 in (3.18 m)
Wing area: 349.5 ft² (32.5 m²)
Airfoil: RAF 28
Empty weight: 2,530 lb (1,150 kg)
Max. takeoff weight: 4,596 lb (2,089 kg)
Powerplant: 1 × Rolls-Royce Kestrel IB water-cooled V12 engine, 510 hp (380 kW)
Performance
Maximum speed: 161 kn (185 mph, 298 km/h) at 13,000 ft
Stall speed: 39 kn (45 mph, 72 km/h) [42]
Range: 374 nmi (430 mi, 692 km)
Service ceiling: 22,800 ft (6,950 m)
Wing loading: 13.2 lb/ft² (64.3 kg/m²)
Power/mass: 0.11 hp/lb (0.182 kW/kg)
Climb to 10,000 ft 8 minutes, 30 seconds
Armament
Guns: 1 × synchronised forward firing .303 in (7.7 mm) Vickers machine gun, 1 × .303 in (7.7 mm) Lewis Gun on Scarff ring in rear cockpit.
Bombs: Up to 500 lb (227 kg) bombs under wings
This thing can dive bomb and hold its own against US and Japanese fighters. Part of the reason for that quality is that British aero engines outperform US and Japanese equivalents by a 8-10 hp per hundredweight ratio and the British, until the NACA airfoil survey is completed in 1932, have superior understanding of windflow over wing and better designed propellers. That will change radically by 1935, but we are in `1928-1930 at the moment.
Now why no monoplanes yet? Actually there are a few for the Americans;
Specifications (XP-15. XF5B)
Data from Angelucci 1987, pp. 81–82.
General characteristics
Crew: one
Length: 21 ft 0 in (6.40 m)
Wingspan: 30 ft 6 in (9.29 m)
Height: 9 ft 4.5 in (2.84 m)
Wing area: 157.3 ft2 (14.61 m2)
Empty weight: 2,052 lb (931 kg)
Gross weight: 2,746 lb (1,246 kg)
Powerplant: 1 × Pratt & Whitney SR-1340D, 525 hp (391 kW)
Performance
Maximum speed: 190.2 mph (306 km/h)
Cruise speed: 160 mph (257 km/h)
Range: 420 miles (676 km)
Service ceiling: 27,650 ft (8,428 m)
Rate of climb: 1,800 ft/min (9.15 m/s)
Armament
2 x .30 inch machine guns
The plane is a reject for several reasons; one, it has poor climb rate in spite of the numbers officially cited; two, its stall characteristics are terrible; three; current fighters can outturn it; four, pilot visibility for landings is poor compared to the referent F4B.
And then there is Lockheed:
Specifications (YP-24. XF1O)
Data from Lockheed Aircraft since 1913
General characteristics
Crew: two
Length: 28 ft 9 in (8.76 m)
Wingspan: 42 ft 9½ in (13.04 m)
Height: 8 ft 6 in (2.59 m)
Wing area: 292 ft² (27.1 m²)
Empty weight: 3,010 lb (1,365 kg)
Loaded weight: 4,360 lb (1,978 kg)
Max. takeoff weight; 5,000lb (2,268 kg)
Powerplant: 1 × Curtiss V-1570-23 "Conqueror" liquid-cooled V12 engine, 600 hp (448 kW)
Propellers: 3-bladed propeller
Performance
Maximum speed: 235 mph (204 knots, 378 km/h)
Cruise speed: 215 mph (187 knots, 346 km/h)
Range: 556 mi (483 nm, 895 km)
Service ceiling: 25,000 ft (7,620 m)
Rate of climb: 1,820 ft/min (9.3 m/s)
Armament
Guns:
1× 0.50 in (12.7 mm) machine gun firing through the propeller
1× 0.30 in (7.62 mm) machine gun firing through the propeller
1× 0.30 in machine gun in rear cockpit
This is my preferred AU aircraft to be modified. The problem is that I have to get rid of the Conqueror engine which is a dog of a maintenance nightmare and handwave a folding wing and the retractable landing gear. This tech is so brand new that the prototype is lost in a augur in when the pilot bails out rather than lands^1 (He breaks the lever off to lower the wheels, but with a fire in his lap, can you blame him?), when the engine catches fire in a test flight.^2
Specifications (V-1570-59)
General characteristics
Type: 12-cylinder liquid-cooled Vee aircraft engine
Bore: 5 1⁄8 in (130.2mm)
Stroke: 6 11⁄32 in (161.1mm)
Displacement: 1,570.4 in³ (25.73 L)
Dry weight: 770 lbs (349 kg)
Components
Cooling system: Liquid-cooled
Performance
Power output: 675 hp (504 kW) at 2,450 rpm
Specific power: 0.43 hp/in³ (19.6 kW/l)
The engine cannot be supercharged without it catching fire or blowing oil everywhere; you know? Your typical piece of Curtiss crap.
So what to do?
Specifications (GR-1820-G2)
Data from Tsygulev
General characteristics
Type: Nine-cylinder single-row supercharged air-cooled radial engine
Bore: 6 1⁄8 in (155.6 mm)
Stroke: 6 7⁄8 in (174.6 mm)
Displacement: 1,823 in³ (29.88 L)
Length: 47.76 in (1,213 mm)
Diameter: 54.25 in (1,378 mm)
Dry weight: 1,184 lb (537 kg)
Components
Valve train: Two overhead valves per cylinder with sodium-filled exhaust valve
Supercharger: Single-speed General Electric centrifugal type supercharger, blower ratio 7.134:1
Fuel system: Stromberg PD12K10 downdraft carburetor with automatic mixture control or Hesselmann ANBAC direct fuel injection.
Fuel type: 87 octane rating gasoline
Oil system: Dry sump with one pressure and one scavenging pump
Cooling system: Air-cooled
Performance
Power output: 700-1,000 hp (520 -746 kW) at 2,200 rpm for takeoff
Specific power: 0,40-0.46 hp/in³ (20.88 kW/L)
Compression ratio: 6.45:1
Specific fuel consumption: 0.6 lb/(hp•h) (362 g/(kW•h))
Oil consumption: 0.35-0.39 oz/(hp•h) (13-15 g/(kW•h))
Power-to-weight ratio: 0.70-0.84 hp/lb (1.10-1.39 kW/kg)
Still leaks oil, is heavier and catches fire, but gives 30% more range and can be supercharged.
Fix the balky landing gear on the Lockheed and voila, strike fighter (1931).
*1 I had to correct the record. It was one of the Boeing XF5Bs that caught fire. The engine seized up, the propeller tore loose and the plane was destroyed.
*2 I had to correct the record again. The XP-24 caught fire like the XF5B but this time the pilot had to bail out and lose the plane.
Mister Hoover's Navy
Moderator: Community Manager
Re: Mister Hoover's Navy
Last edited by Tobius on October 2nd, 2017, 5:29 am, edited 2 times in total.
Re: Mister Hoover's Navy
FLUFF: HERE IS SOME OF THE CAST OF CHARACTERS ONE NEEDS TO FOLLOW IN THIS AU; AND SOMETHING ABOUT RADIO AND CABLE INTELLIGENCE OF THE 1930S THAT MAY HAVE ESCAPED NOTICE.
Admiral Frank Schofield (PacFleet Actual)
R. Admiral Harry E. Yarnell (TF 10.1 Actual) Flagship USS Saratoga
Captain Ernest King USS Lexington
Captain Frederick J. Horne USS Saratoga
Captain Frank McCrary USS Cowpens
R. Admiral Henry Varnum Butler (TF 10.2 Actual) Flagship USS Yorktown
Captain George W. Steele USS Trenton
Captain Rufus F. Zogbaum USS Yorktown
Captain Frank A. Berrien USS Ticonderoga
R. Admiral Claude C. Bloch (10.2.1) flagship USS California
V. Admiral Joseph Mason "Bull" Reeves 10.1.1 flagship USS Maryland
FLUFF: HOW DID PLAN DOG EVOLVE? IT IS NOT EASY TO BE AFFIRMATIVE.
Blame Fleet Problem VII through X and Hector Bywater’s published account of how a Pacific war between the United States and Japan could erupt and spread. The American navy Fleet Problems off Nicaragua and in Hawaiian waters; quickly show that Orange cannot be allowed the opening move in such a war. The damage Orange could inflict parallel the same kind of paralyzing effect that prove to be the Russian fleet’s undoing after the surprise attack on Port Arthur during the Russo Japanese War.
Plan Dog is one of four Alternate Universe Orange war plans. These plans are:
1. Plan Affirmative: relief of the Philippines after a Japanese invasion of the Archipelago
2. Plan Baker: relief of the Shanghai Enclave after a Japanese attack in the Jiangsu Province.
3. Plan Cast: defense of the central Pacific island possessions.
4. Plan Dog: imposition of a blockade on the Japanese islands.
One can ascribe the plans to these putative authors;
Sims; Plan Affirmative about 1903
Butler; Plan Baker about 1918
Marine Major Ellis; Plan Cast about 1924
Reeves; Plan Dog about 1930
THE SITUATION STRATEGICALLY.
As in the RTL, the USN is in a position of inferiority. It is usually at this point that the beancounters want to see a table to show the disparity, so here is a table to satisfy them (AU of course):
Nation …………………………………………….US (Pacific) …………………………………. Japan………………….. Holland……………….US (Atlantic)
Ship type
Battleship ……………………………………….8 (4 slow, 4 fast)……………………………7 ………………………………………………………..4 (4 slow)
Battlecruiser …………………………………………………………………………………………. 4 …………………………. (2)
Aircraft carrier ………………………………..6 (6 large) ……………………………………..5 (3 large, 2 small)……………………………..3 (3 small)
Aircraft carrier aircraft embarked ….6x60=360 ………………………………………65+62+60+31+27=246 ……………………….3x45=135
Fleet based air scouts …………………….53 …………………………………………………~100 ……………………(25)……………………..28
Land based air
………… Fighters ……………………………… ~400 (US total) ……………………………In Japan ~400 ………(50) Indonesia
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………In China ~500
………… Bombers ……………………………. ~500 (US total) ………………………… .In Japan ~100 ……... (50) Indonesia
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………...In China ~200
…………Scouts …………………………………. ~200 )US total)………………………….. In Japan ~100 ……..(50) Indonesia
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………In China ~200
…………Transports …………………………….~100 (plus ~400+ civil aviation)….In Japan ~100……….. ?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………In China ~100
………..Trainers ………………………………….~100 (plus ~700+ civil aviation)….In Japan ~400 ……..(50) Indonesia
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………In China ~100?
Scout cruiser ………………………………………6…………………………………………………2 ……………………………………………………………..4
Heavy cruiser ……………………………………10………………………………………………12 ……………………………………………………………..2
Light cruiser ………………………………………12 ……………………………………………..11…………………………… 4 ……………………………..6
Heavy destroyer (over 2500 tonnes)..25 ……………………………………………..21 …………………………………………………………….25
Light destroyer (~1500-2000 tonnes). 50 ……………………………………………….6 ……………………………12 ……………………………50
Corvette (below 1000 tonnes) ………… 10 …………………………………………….22…………………………….15…………………………….20
Submarines………………………………………. 47 …………………………………………….98 (70 available)………………….…………………….20
Oiler……………………………………………………16 (plus 50 Merchant marine)…..8 (plus 15 Merchant marine)……………………4
Ammunition ship ……………………………….5………………………………………………. 4 ……………………………………………………………….4
Stores ship …………………………………………5……………………………………………….3………………………………………………………………..3
Floating drydock ………………………………...3………………………………………………. 1………………………………………………………………..2
Tender, submarine……………………………..2……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………3
Tender, seaplane ……………………………….3 ……………………………………………..4………………………………………………………………..2
Tender, destroyer ………………………………5 ……………………………………………..2 ………………………………………………………………10
Command ship…………………………………….2………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….2
Hospital ship ……………………………………….3………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….1
What the AU table does not indicate is the following:
a. The AU US slow battleships are slower than their four Japanese battlecruiser counterparts, and equivalent in speed to their Japanese slow battleships counterparts. The Japanese are in the middle of their battlecruiser to fast battleship modernization program, so ship availability is only eight of the eleven ships they plan to have. Of further note; the Japanese battleships are armed with a mix of 14 inch (35.6 cm on 8 ships) and 16.1 inch guns in main battery (41 cm on 3 ships). The Americans are uniformly armed with 15.75 cm (40 cm guns on 8 ships in the Pacific fleet + the 4 ships in the Atlantic fleet). Theoretical shell throw weight
Japanese battle-line 24,000 kg (Nagato class) + 61,000 kg (other Japanese battleship classes) = 85,000 kg
American Pacific battle-line 64,000 kg (8 battleships) + Atlantic reserve 32,000 kg (4 battleships) = 96,000 kg
The actual shell throw weight ratio with just the Pacific battle-line forces: works out to about 75% ratio with the advantage Japanese. It holds this ratio to about that uniform value on a fleet wide basis up and down the ladder of ship classes. If it is a Jutland replay, for which the Japanese plan, the odds do not look so good for Uncle even if the Americans bring in the Atlantic circus.
b. This is the mistake many bean-counters make. Leadership, geography, situation awareness, and just plain overall competence applied to the task at hand often matters more than mere numbers. How much arrives at the point of contact, and how effective it is, can be said to be more deterministic to outcomes. Plans, methods, and execution based on situation awareness; matters as much as hardware, sometimes even more than hardware. Certainly in a naval war, which is simpler and more fundamental in basics than land warfare in 1931; this is so. So you are an American and you have a war in your lap.
What are the AU American advantages?
Thanks to the ONI and the FBI: the American government/naval service can read Japanese, Russian, Chinese, Dutch, French, Italian, British, and even German diplomatic radio traffic. This is a situational awareness advantage that not even the British possess. The Americans can basically estimate who, where, what, how, and why the players in the Pacific are and what they do. From this advantage, once the SS Milliard Filmore Incident occurs, what do the Americans know?
Vice admiral Kichisaburo Nomuro in command of the Japanese 3rd Fleet and the China Expedition Force is a political appointment and has extensive questionable personal issues that inhibit his command style and unit combat efficiency. At Shanghai (1932 RTL Shanghai Incident) the Americans operationally quickly become aware of his military incompetence. They will exploit his personal weaknesses.
The Japanese are like the Italians, embarked on a massive fleet modernization program, 1928-1935, which will ultimately take up to a third of the fleet out of service (1931). This is especially true of the Kongo class battleships. As for the carriers, (In this AU; the Akagi, Amagi and Atago), the Japanese are so new to the business, that these ships still sport the atrocious three bow fly-off platforms and short main flight deck. This allows for about sixty-sixty five aircraft per carrier and a slow launch cycle. These carriers are not in the modification que as the battleships are. They are at sea working up, under British tutelage (Sempill Mission), how to operate the weapon system. It is not generally understood, that the Japanese in 1931 have not figured the aircraft carrier out. It will still be a mystery until around 1937 when they get the Akagi built right.
The Japanese fleet, because of the Second Sino-Japanese War, shift (RTL 1931-1933; AU about the same time frame) about half of their fleet usually based at Yokusuka Inland Sea base complexes, to the Sasebo and Kogashima naval complexes to support the China coast operations. This shift affects the way that any American pre-emptive attack would have to be oriented. For if the first Plan Dog is weighted toward Honshu; then the fifth rework puts the weight of emphasis on Kyushu where it properly belongs.
Although not a part of signals intelligence or cryptanalysis, radio direction mapping plays a part of economic intelligence. The Americans pioneer it in 1938 (RTL), but in this AU it is 1928. ONI generates a rather good time map of what the Japanese merchant marine does. The State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research provides its own input about what the Japanese economy is and where it is vulnerable. After the surprise attack, there must come the blockade (Mahan and Colbert). American submarines will hunt oil tankers and grain ships to put them in the dark and keep them hungry.
1931, the British are helping the Japanese. One does not care about the Angl;o-American brothers in arms mythology post WW II because it is post facto revisionism of the 1930s. The whitewash is quite faded by now as the truth comes out. Sempill had semi-official British crown sanction to commit his treason (from a strictly American point of view.), until about 1940, when the Americans find out about “the gentleman”. It is not until 1942 that the British muzzle him. He dies peacefully, unpunished, in 1956. Now one must recognize that the US is aware that the Japanese do British aviation type things the British way because the Americans Read Everybody’s Diplomatic Mail and the Americans can also compare what they see in the Pacific. The Americans have a ship that passes among the Japanese carriers exercising off Hokkaido as they practice for Blue RTL 1930 and the same thing happens for the British carriers exercising in the eastern Mediterranean in their anti-Italian wargames. Can one imagine “Bull” Reeves in 1931 when he reads about what is uncovered in his daily intel reports? How about Schofield or King? The USN leadership is not a happy bunch of sailors about what the evidence reveals. (Richardson, Turner, and Tower are other Anglophobes who can be explained by this all too real history, too.)
Admiral Frank Schofield (PacFleet Actual)
R. Admiral Harry E. Yarnell (TF 10.1 Actual) Flagship USS Saratoga
Captain Ernest King USS Lexington
Captain Frederick J. Horne USS Saratoga
Captain Frank McCrary USS Cowpens
R. Admiral Henry Varnum Butler (TF 10.2 Actual) Flagship USS Yorktown
Captain George W. Steele USS Trenton
Captain Rufus F. Zogbaum USS Yorktown
Captain Frank A. Berrien USS Ticonderoga
R. Admiral Claude C. Bloch (10.2.1) flagship USS California
V. Admiral Joseph Mason "Bull" Reeves 10.1.1 flagship USS Maryland
FLUFF: HOW DID PLAN DOG EVOLVE? IT IS NOT EASY TO BE AFFIRMATIVE.
Blame Fleet Problem VII through X and Hector Bywater’s published account of how a Pacific war between the United States and Japan could erupt and spread. The American navy Fleet Problems off Nicaragua and in Hawaiian waters; quickly show that Orange cannot be allowed the opening move in such a war. The damage Orange could inflict parallel the same kind of paralyzing effect that prove to be the Russian fleet’s undoing after the surprise attack on Port Arthur during the Russo Japanese War.
Plan Dog is one of four Alternate Universe Orange war plans. These plans are:
1. Plan Affirmative: relief of the Philippines after a Japanese invasion of the Archipelago
2. Plan Baker: relief of the Shanghai Enclave after a Japanese attack in the Jiangsu Province.
3. Plan Cast: defense of the central Pacific island possessions.
4. Plan Dog: imposition of a blockade on the Japanese islands.
One can ascribe the plans to these putative authors;
Sims; Plan Affirmative about 1903
Butler; Plan Baker about 1918
Marine Major Ellis; Plan Cast about 1924
Reeves; Plan Dog about 1930
THE SITUATION STRATEGICALLY.
As in the RTL, the USN is in a position of inferiority. It is usually at this point that the beancounters want to see a table to show the disparity, so here is a table to satisfy them (AU of course):
Nation …………………………………………….US (Pacific) …………………………………. Japan………………….. Holland……………….US (Atlantic)
Ship type
Battleship ……………………………………….8 (4 slow, 4 fast)……………………………7 ………………………………………………………..4 (4 slow)
Battlecruiser …………………………………………………………………………………………. 4 …………………………. (2)
Aircraft carrier ………………………………..6 (6 large) ……………………………………..5 (3 large, 2 small)……………………………..3 (3 small)
Aircraft carrier aircraft embarked ….6x60=360 ………………………………………65+62+60+31+27=246 ……………………….3x45=135
Fleet based air scouts …………………….53 …………………………………………………~100 ……………………(25)……………………..28
Land based air
………… Fighters ……………………………… ~400 (US total) ……………………………In Japan ~400 ………(50) Indonesia
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………In China ~500
………… Bombers ……………………………. ~500 (US total) ………………………… .In Japan ~100 ……... (50) Indonesia
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………...In China ~200
…………Scouts …………………………………. ~200 )US total)………………………….. In Japan ~100 ……..(50) Indonesia
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………In China ~200
…………Transports …………………………….~100 (plus ~400+ civil aviation)….In Japan ~100……….. ?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………In China ~100
………..Trainers ………………………………….~100 (plus ~700+ civil aviation)….In Japan ~400 ……..(50) Indonesia
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………In China ~100?
Scout cruiser ………………………………………6…………………………………………………2 ……………………………………………………………..4
Heavy cruiser ……………………………………10………………………………………………12 ……………………………………………………………..2
Light cruiser ………………………………………12 ……………………………………………..11…………………………… 4 ……………………………..6
Heavy destroyer (over 2500 tonnes)..25 ……………………………………………..21 …………………………………………………………….25
Light destroyer (~1500-2000 tonnes). 50 ……………………………………………….6 ……………………………12 ……………………………50
Corvette (below 1000 tonnes) ………… 10 …………………………………………….22…………………………….15…………………………….20
Submarines………………………………………. 47 …………………………………………….98 (70 available)………………….…………………….20
Oiler……………………………………………………16 (plus 50 Merchant marine)…..8 (plus 15 Merchant marine)……………………4
Ammunition ship ……………………………….5………………………………………………. 4 ……………………………………………………………….4
Stores ship …………………………………………5……………………………………………….3………………………………………………………………..3
Floating drydock ………………………………...3………………………………………………. 1………………………………………………………………..2
Tender, submarine……………………………..2……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………3
Tender, seaplane ……………………………….3 ……………………………………………..4………………………………………………………………..2
Tender, destroyer ………………………………5 ……………………………………………..2 ………………………………………………………………10
Command ship…………………………………….2………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….2
Hospital ship ……………………………………….3………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….1
What the AU table does not indicate is the following:
a. The AU US slow battleships are slower than their four Japanese battlecruiser counterparts, and equivalent in speed to their Japanese slow battleships counterparts. The Japanese are in the middle of their battlecruiser to fast battleship modernization program, so ship availability is only eight of the eleven ships they plan to have. Of further note; the Japanese battleships are armed with a mix of 14 inch (35.6 cm on 8 ships) and 16.1 inch guns in main battery (41 cm on 3 ships). The Americans are uniformly armed with 15.75 cm (40 cm guns on 8 ships in the Pacific fleet + the 4 ships in the Atlantic fleet). Theoretical shell throw weight
Japanese battle-line 24,000 kg (Nagato class) + 61,000 kg (other Japanese battleship classes) = 85,000 kg
American Pacific battle-line 64,000 kg (8 battleships) + Atlantic reserve 32,000 kg (4 battleships) = 96,000 kg
The actual shell throw weight ratio with just the Pacific battle-line forces: works out to about 75% ratio with the advantage Japanese. It holds this ratio to about that uniform value on a fleet wide basis up and down the ladder of ship classes. If it is a Jutland replay, for which the Japanese plan, the odds do not look so good for Uncle even if the Americans bring in the Atlantic circus.
b. This is the mistake many bean-counters make. Leadership, geography, situation awareness, and just plain overall competence applied to the task at hand often matters more than mere numbers. How much arrives at the point of contact, and how effective it is, can be said to be more deterministic to outcomes. Plans, methods, and execution based on situation awareness; matters as much as hardware, sometimes even more than hardware. Certainly in a naval war, which is simpler and more fundamental in basics than land warfare in 1931; this is so. So you are an American and you have a war in your lap.
What are the AU American advantages?
Thanks to the ONI and the FBI: the American government/naval service can read Japanese, Russian, Chinese, Dutch, French, Italian, British, and even German diplomatic radio traffic. This is a situational awareness advantage that not even the British possess. The Americans can basically estimate who, where, what, how, and why the players in the Pacific are and what they do. From this advantage, once the SS Milliard Filmore Incident occurs, what do the Americans know?
Vice admiral Kichisaburo Nomuro in command of the Japanese 3rd Fleet and the China Expedition Force is a political appointment and has extensive questionable personal issues that inhibit his command style and unit combat efficiency. At Shanghai (1932 RTL Shanghai Incident) the Americans operationally quickly become aware of his military incompetence. They will exploit his personal weaknesses.
The Japanese are like the Italians, embarked on a massive fleet modernization program, 1928-1935, which will ultimately take up to a third of the fleet out of service (1931). This is especially true of the Kongo class battleships. As for the carriers, (In this AU; the Akagi, Amagi and Atago), the Japanese are so new to the business, that these ships still sport the atrocious three bow fly-off platforms and short main flight deck. This allows for about sixty-sixty five aircraft per carrier and a slow launch cycle. These carriers are not in the modification que as the battleships are. They are at sea working up, under British tutelage (Sempill Mission), how to operate the weapon system. It is not generally understood, that the Japanese in 1931 have not figured the aircraft carrier out. It will still be a mystery until around 1937 when they get the Akagi built right.
The Japanese fleet, because of the Second Sino-Japanese War, shift (RTL 1931-1933; AU about the same time frame) about half of their fleet usually based at Yokusuka Inland Sea base complexes, to the Sasebo and Kogashima naval complexes to support the China coast operations. This shift affects the way that any American pre-emptive attack would have to be oriented. For if the first Plan Dog is weighted toward Honshu; then the fifth rework puts the weight of emphasis on Kyushu where it properly belongs.
Although not a part of signals intelligence or cryptanalysis, radio direction mapping plays a part of economic intelligence. The Americans pioneer it in 1938 (RTL), but in this AU it is 1928. ONI generates a rather good time map of what the Japanese merchant marine does. The State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research provides its own input about what the Japanese economy is and where it is vulnerable. After the surprise attack, there must come the blockade (Mahan and Colbert). American submarines will hunt oil tankers and grain ships to put them in the dark and keep them hungry.
1931, the British are helping the Japanese. One does not care about the Angl;o-American brothers in arms mythology post WW II because it is post facto revisionism of the 1930s. The whitewash is quite faded by now as the truth comes out. Sempill had semi-official British crown sanction to commit his treason (from a strictly American point of view.), until about 1940, when the Americans find out about “the gentleman”. It is not until 1942 that the British muzzle him. He dies peacefully, unpunished, in 1956. Now one must recognize that the US is aware that the Japanese do British aviation type things the British way because the Americans Read Everybody’s Diplomatic Mail and the Americans can also compare what they see in the Pacific. The Americans have a ship that passes among the Japanese carriers exercising off Hokkaido as they practice for Blue RTL 1930 and the same thing happens for the British carriers exercising in the eastern Mediterranean in their anti-Italian wargames. Can one imagine “Bull” Reeves in 1931 when he reads about what is uncovered in his daily intel reports? How about Schofield or King? The USN leadership is not a happy bunch of sailors about what the evidence reveals. (Richardson, Turner, and Tower are other Anglophobes who can be explained by this all too real history, too.)
Last edited by Tobius on October 4th, 2017, 4:44 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Mister Hoover's Navy
FLUFF: HERE IS SOME OF THE CAST OF CHARACTERS ONE NEEDS TO FOLLOW IN THIS AU; AND SOMETHING ABOUT RADIO AND CABLE INTELLIGENCE OF THE 1930S THAT MAY HAVE ESCAPED NOTICE.
Admiral Frank Schofield (PacFleet Actual)
R. Admiral Harry E. Yarnell (TF 10.1 Actual) Flagship USS Saratoga
R. Admiral Henry Varnum Butler (TF 10.2 Actual)
Captain Ernest King USS Lexington
Captain Frederick J. Horne USS Saratoga
Captain Frank McCrary USS Cowpens
Captain George W. Steele USS Trenton
Captain Rufus F. Zogbaum USS Yorktown
Captain Frank A. Berrien USS Ticonderoga
R. Admiral Claude C. Bloch (10.2.1) flagship USS California
V. Admiral Joseph Mason "Bull" Reeves 10.1.1 flagship USS Maryland
FLUFF: HOW DID PLAN DOG EVOLVE? IT IS NOT EASY TO BE AFFIRMATIVE.
Blame Fleet Problem VII through X and Hector Bywater’s published account of how a Pacific war between the United States and Japan could erupt and spread. The American navy Fleet Problems off Nicaragua and in Hawaiian waters; quickly show that Orange cannot be allowed the opening move in such a war. The damage Orange could inflict parallel the same kind of paralyzing effect that prove to be the Russian fleet’s undoing after the surprise attack on Port Arthur during the Russo Japanese War.
Plan Dog is one of four Alternate Universe Orange war plans. These plans are:
1. Plan Affirmative: relief of the Philippines after a Japanese invasion of the Archipelago
2. Plan Baker: relief of the Shanghai Enclave after a Japanese attack in the Jiangsu Province.
3. Plan Cast: defense of the central Pacific island possessions.
4. Plan Dog: imposition of a blockade on the Japanese islands.
One can ascribe the plans to these putative authors;
Sims; Plan Affirmative about 1903
Butler; Plan Baker about 1918
Marine Major Ellis; Plan Cast about 1924
Reeves; Plan Dog about 1930
THE SITUATION STRATEGICALLY.
As in the RTL, the USN is in a position of inferiority. It is usually at this point that the beancounters want to see a table to show the disparity, so here is a table to satisfy them (AU of course):
Nation …………………………………………….US (Pacific) …………………………………. Japan………………….. Holland……………….US (Atlantic)
Ship type
Battleship ……………………………………….8 (4 slow, 4 fast)……………………………7 ………………………………………………………..4 (4 slow)
Battlecruiser …………………………………………………………………………………………. 4 …………………………. (2)
Aircraft carrier ………………………………..6 (6 large) ……………………………………..5 (3 large, 2 small)……………………………..3 (3 small)
Aircraft carrier aircraft embarked ….6x60=360 ………………………………………65+62+60+31+27=246 ……………………….3x45=135
Fleet based air scouts …………………….53 …………………………………………………~100 ……………………(25)……………………..28
Land based air
………… Fighters ……………………………… ~400 (US total) ……………………………In Japan ~400 ………(50) Indonesia
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………In China ~500
………… Bombers ……………………………. ~500 (US total) ………………………… .In Japan ~100 ……... (50) Indonesia
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………...In China ~200
…………Scouts …………………………………. ~200 )US total)………………………….. In Japan ~100 ……..(50) Indonesia
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………In China ~200
…………Transports …………………………….~100 (plus ~400+ civil aviation)….In Japan ~100……….. ?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………In China ~100
………..Trainers ………………………………….~100 (plus ~700+ civil aviation)….In Japan ~400 ……..(50) Indonesia
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………In China ~100?
Scout cruiser ………………………………………6…………………………………………………2 ……………………………………………………………..4
Heavy cruiser ……………………………………10………………………………………………12 ……………………………………………………………..2
Light cruiser ………………………………………12 ……………………………………………..11…………………………… 4 ……………………………..6
Heavy destroyer (over 2500 tonnes)..25 ……………………………………………..21 …………………………………………………………….25
Light destroyer (~1500-2000 tonnes). 50 ……………………………………………….6 ……………………………12 ……………………………50
Corvette (below 1000 tonnes) ………… 10 …………………………………………….22…………………………….15…………………………….20
Submarines………………………………………. 47 …………………………………………….98 (70 available)………………….…………………….20
Oiler……………………………………………………16 (plus 50 Merchant marine)…..8 (plus 15 Merchant marine)……………………4
Ammunition ship ……………………………….5………………………………………………. 4 ……………………………………………………………….4
Stores ship …………………………………………5……………………………………………….3………………………………………………………………..3
Floating drydock ………………………………...3………………………………………………. 1………………………………………………………………..2
Tender, submarine……………………………..2……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………3
Tender, seaplane ……………………………….3 ……………………………………………..4………………………………………………………………..2
Tender, destroyer ………………………………5 ……………………………………………..2 ………………………………………………………………10
Command ship…………………………………….2………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….2
Hospital ship ……………………………………….3………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….1
What the AU table does not indicate is the following:
a. The AU US slow battleships are slower than their four Japanese battlecruiser counterparts, and equivalent in speed to their Japanese slow battleships counterparts. The Japanese are in the middle of their battlecruiser to fast battleship modernization program, so ship availability is only eight of the eleven ships they plan to have. Of further note; the Japanese battleships are armed with a mix of 14 inch (35.6 cm on 8 ships) and 16.1 inch guns in main battery (41 cm on 3 ships). The Americans are uniformly armed with 15.75 cm (40 cm guns on 8 ships in the Pacific fleet + the 4 ships in the Atlantic fleet). Theoretical shell throw weight
Japanese battle-line 24,000 kg (Nagato class) + 61,000 kg (other Japanese battleship classes) = 85,000 kg
American Pacific battle-line 64,000 kg (8 battleships) + Atlantic reserve 32,000 kg (4 battleships) = 96,000 kg
The actual shell throw weight ratio with just the Pacific battle-line forces: works out to about 75% ratio with the advantage Japanese. It holds this ratio to about that uniform value on a fleet wide basis up and down the ladder of ship classes. If it is a Jutland replay, for which the Japanese plan, the odds do not look so good for Uncle even if the Americans bring in the Atlantic circus.
b. This is the mistake many bean-counters make. Leadership, geography, situation awareness, and just plain overall competence applied to the task at hand often matters more than mere numbers. How much arrives at the point of contact, and how effective it is, can be said to be more deterministic to outcomes. Plans, methods, and execution based on situation awareness; matters as much as hardware, sometimes even more than hardware. Certainly in a naval war, which is simpler and more fundamental in basics than land warfare in 1931; this is so. So you are an American and you have a war in your lap.
What are the AU American advantages?
c. Thanks to the ONI and the FBI: the American government/naval service can read Japanese, Russian, Chinese, Dutch, French, Italian, British, and even German diplomatic radio traffic. This is a situational awareness advantage that not even the British possess. The Americans can basically estimate who, where, what, how, and why the players in the Pacific are and what they do. From this advantage, once the SS Milliard Filmore Incident occurs, what do the Americans know?
d. Vice admiral Kichisaburo Nomuro in command of the Japanese 3rd Fleet and the China Expedition Force is a political appointment and has extensive questionable personal issues that inhibit his command style and unit combat efficiency. At Shanghai (1932 RTL Shanghai Incident) the Americans operationally quickly become aware of his military incompetence. They will exploit his personal weaknesses.
e. The Japanese are like the Italians, embarked on a massive fleet modernization program, 1928-1935, which will ultimately take up to a third of the fleet out of service (1931). This is especially true of the Kongo class battleships. As for the carriers, (In this AU; the Akagi, Amagi and Atago), the Japanese are so new to the business, that these ships still sport the atrocious three bow fly-off platforms and short main flight deck. This allows for about sixty-sixty five aircraft per carrier and a slow launch cycle. These carriers are not in the modification que as the battleships are. They are at sea working up, under British tutelage (Sempill Mission), how to operate the weapon system. It is not generally understood, that the Japanese in 1931 have not figured the aircraft carrier out. It will still be a mystery until around 1937 when they get the Akagi built right.
f. The Japanese fleet, because of the Second Sino-Japanese War, shift (RTL 1931-1933; AU about the same time frame) about half of their fleet usually based at Yokusuka Inland Sea base complexes, to the Sasebo and Kogashima naval complexes to support the China coast operations. This shift affects the way that any American pre-emptive attack would have to be oriented. For if the first Plan Dog is weighted toward Honshu; then the fifth rework puts the weight of emphasis on Kyushu where it properly belongs.
g. Although not a part of signals intelligence or cryptanalysis, radio direction mapping plays a part of economic intelligence. The Americans pioneer it in 1938 (RTL), but in this AU it is 1928. ONI generates a rather good time map of what the Japanese merchant marine does. The State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research provides its own input about what the Japanese economy is and where it is vulnerable. After the surprise attack, there must come the blockade (Mahan and Colbert). American submarines will hunt oil tankers and grain ships to put them in the dark and keep them hungry.
h. 1931, the British are helping the Japanese. One does not care about the Angl;o-American brothers in arms mythology post WW II because it is post facto revisionism of the 1930s. The whitewash is quite faded by now as the truth comes out. Sempill had semi-official British crown sanction to commit his treason (from a strictly American point of view.), until about 1940, when the Americans find out about “the gentleman”. It is not until 1942 that the British muzzle him. He dies peacefully, unpunished, in 1956. Now one must recognize that the US is aware that the Japanese do British aviation type things the British way because the Americans Read Everybody’s Diplomatic Mail and the Americans can also compare what they see in the Pacific. The Americans have a ship that passes among the Japanese carriers exercising off Hokkaido as they practice for Blue RTL 1930 and the same thing happens for the British carriers exercising in the eastern Mediterranean in their anti-Italian wargames. Can one imagine “Bull” Reeves in 1931 when he reads about what is uncovered in his daily intel reports? How about Schofield or King? The USN leadership is not a happy bunch of sailors about what the evidence reveals. (Richardson, Turner, and Tower are other Anglophobes who can be explained by this all too real history, too.)
Admiral Frank Schofield (PacFleet Actual)
R. Admiral Harry E. Yarnell (TF 10.1 Actual) Flagship USS Saratoga
R. Admiral Henry Varnum Butler (TF 10.2 Actual)
Captain Ernest King USS Lexington
Captain Frederick J. Horne USS Saratoga
Captain Frank McCrary USS Cowpens
Captain George W. Steele USS Trenton
Captain Rufus F. Zogbaum USS Yorktown
Captain Frank A. Berrien USS Ticonderoga
R. Admiral Claude C. Bloch (10.2.1) flagship USS California
V. Admiral Joseph Mason "Bull" Reeves 10.1.1 flagship USS Maryland
FLUFF: HOW DID PLAN DOG EVOLVE? IT IS NOT EASY TO BE AFFIRMATIVE.
Blame Fleet Problem VII through X and Hector Bywater’s published account of how a Pacific war between the United States and Japan could erupt and spread. The American navy Fleet Problems off Nicaragua and in Hawaiian waters; quickly show that Orange cannot be allowed the opening move in such a war. The damage Orange could inflict parallel the same kind of paralyzing effect that prove to be the Russian fleet’s undoing after the surprise attack on Port Arthur during the Russo Japanese War.
Plan Dog is one of four Alternate Universe Orange war plans. These plans are:
1. Plan Affirmative: relief of the Philippines after a Japanese invasion of the Archipelago
2. Plan Baker: relief of the Shanghai Enclave after a Japanese attack in the Jiangsu Province.
3. Plan Cast: defense of the central Pacific island possessions.
4. Plan Dog: imposition of a blockade on the Japanese islands.
One can ascribe the plans to these putative authors;
Sims; Plan Affirmative about 1903
Butler; Plan Baker about 1918
Marine Major Ellis; Plan Cast about 1924
Reeves; Plan Dog about 1930
THE SITUATION STRATEGICALLY.
As in the RTL, the USN is in a position of inferiority. It is usually at this point that the beancounters want to see a table to show the disparity, so here is a table to satisfy them (AU of course):
Nation …………………………………………….US (Pacific) …………………………………. Japan………………….. Holland……………….US (Atlantic)
Ship type
Battleship ……………………………………….8 (4 slow, 4 fast)……………………………7 ………………………………………………………..4 (4 slow)
Battlecruiser …………………………………………………………………………………………. 4 …………………………. (2)
Aircraft carrier ………………………………..6 (6 large) ……………………………………..5 (3 large, 2 small)……………………………..3 (3 small)
Aircraft carrier aircraft embarked ….6x60=360 ………………………………………65+62+60+31+27=246 ……………………….3x45=135
Fleet based air scouts …………………….53 …………………………………………………~100 ……………………(25)……………………..28
Land based air
………… Fighters ……………………………… ~400 (US total) ……………………………In Japan ~400 ………(50) Indonesia
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………In China ~500
………… Bombers ……………………………. ~500 (US total) ………………………… .In Japan ~100 ……... (50) Indonesia
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………...In China ~200
…………Scouts …………………………………. ~200 )US total)………………………….. In Japan ~100 ……..(50) Indonesia
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………In China ~200
…………Transports …………………………….~100 (plus ~400+ civil aviation)….In Japan ~100……….. ?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………In China ~100
………..Trainers ………………………………….~100 (plus ~700+ civil aviation)….In Japan ~400 ……..(50) Indonesia
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………In China ~100?
Scout cruiser ………………………………………6…………………………………………………2 ……………………………………………………………..4
Heavy cruiser ……………………………………10………………………………………………12 ……………………………………………………………..2
Light cruiser ………………………………………12 ……………………………………………..11…………………………… 4 ……………………………..6
Heavy destroyer (over 2500 tonnes)..25 ……………………………………………..21 …………………………………………………………….25
Light destroyer (~1500-2000 tonnes). 50 ……………………………………………….6 ……………………………12 ……………………………50
Corvette (below 1000 tonnes) ………… 10 …………………………………………….22…………………………….15…………………………….20
Submarines………………………………………. 47 …………………………………………….98 (70 available)………………….…………………….20
Oiler……………………………………………………16 (plus 50 Merchant marine)…..8 (plus 15 Merchant marine)……………………4
Ammunition ship ……………………………….5………………………………………………. 4 ……………………………………………………………….4
Stores ship …………………………………………5……………………………………………….3………………………………………………………………..3
Floating drydock ………………………………...3………………………………………………. 1………………………………………………………………..2
Tender, submarine……………………………..2……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………3
Tender, seaplane ……………………………….3 ……………………………………………..4………………………………………………………………..2
Tender, destroyer ………………………………5 ……………………………………………..2 ………………………………………………………………10
Command ship…………………………………….2………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….2
Hospital ship ……………………………………….3………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….1
What the AU table does not indicate is the following:
a. The AU US slow battleships are slower than their four Japanese battlecruiser counterparts, and equivalent in speed to their Japanese slow battleships counterparts. The Japanese are in the middle of their battlecruiser to fast battleship modernization program, so ship availability is only eight of the eleven ships they plan to have. Of further note; the Japanese battleships are armed with a mix of 14 inch (35.6 cm on 8 ships) and 16.1 inch guns in main battery (41 cm on 3 ships). The Americans are uniformly armed with 15.75 cm (40 cm guns on 8 ships in the Pacific fleet + the 4 ships in the Atlantic fleet). Theoretical shell throw weight
Japanese battle-line 24,000 kg (Nagato class) + 61,000 kg (other Japanese battleship classes) = 85,000 kg
American Pacific battle-line 64,000 kg (8 battleships) + Atlantic reserve 32,000 kg (4 battleships) = 96,000 kg
The actual shell throw weight ratio with just the Pacific battle-line forces: works out to about 75% ratio with the advantage Japanese. It holds this ratio to about that uniform value on a fleet wide basis up and down the ladder of ship classes. If it is a Jutland replay, for which the Japanese plan, the odds do not look so good for Uncle even if the Americans bring in the Atlantic circus.
b. This is the mistake many bean-counters make. Leadership, geography, situation awareness, and just plain overall competence applied to the task at hand often matters more than mere numbers. How much arrives at the point of contact, and how effective it is, can be said to be more deterministic to outcomes. Plans, methods, and execution based on situation awareness; matters as much as hardware, sometimes even more than hardware. Certainly in a naval war, which is simpler and more fundamental in basics than land warfare in 1931; this is so. So you are an American and you have a war in your lap.
What are the AU American advantages?
c. Thanks to the ONI and the FBI: the American government/naval service can read Japanese, Russian, Chinese, Dutch, French, Italian, British, and even German diplomatic radio traffic. This is a situational awareness advantage that not even the British possess. The Americans can basically estimate who, where, what, how, and why the players in the Pacific are and what they do. From this advantage, once the SS Milliard Filmore Incident occurs, what do the Americans know?
d. Vice admiral Kichisaburo Nomuro in command of the Japanese 3rd Fleet and the China Expedition Force is a political appointment and has extensive questionable personal issues that inhibit his command style and unit combat efficiency. At Shanghai (1932 RTL Shanghai Incident) the Americans operationally quickly become aware of his military incompetence. They will exploit his personal weaknesses.
e. The Japanese are like the Italians, embarked on a massive fleet modernization program, 1928-1935, which will ultimately take up to a third of the fleet out of service (1931). This is especially true of the Kongo class battleships. As for the carriers, (In this AU; the Akagi, Amagi and Atago), the Japanese are so new to the business, that these ships still sport the atrocious three bow fly-off platforms and short main flight deck. This allows for about sixty-sixty five aircraft per carrier and a slow launch cycle. These carriers are not in the modification que as the battleships are. They are at sea working up, under British tutelage (Sempill Mission), how to operate the weapon system. It is not generally understood, that the Japanese in 1931 have not figured the aircraft carrier out. It will still be a mystery until around 1937 when they get the Akagi built right.
f. The Japanese fleet, because of the Second Sino-Japanese War, shift (RTL 1931-1933; AU about the same time frame) about half of their fleet usually based at Yokusuka Inland Sea base complexes, to the Sasebo and Kogashima naval complexes to support the China coast operations. This shift affects the way that any American pre-emptive attack would have to be oriented. For if the first Plan Dog is weighted toward Honshu; then the fifth rework puts the weight of emphasis on Kyushu where it properly belongs.
g. Although not a part of signals intelligence or cryptanalysis, radio direction mapping plays a part of economic intelligence. The Americans pioneer it in 1938 (RTL), but in this AU it is 1928. ONI generates a rather good time map of what the Japanese merchant marine does. The State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research provides its own input about what the Japanese economy is and where it is vulnerable. After the surprise attack, there must come the blockade (Mahan and Colbert). American submarines will hunt oil tankers and grain ships to put them in the dark and keep them hungry.
h. 1931, the British are helping the Japanese. One does not care about the Angl;o-American brothers in arms mythology post WW II because it is post facto revisionism of the 1930s. The whitewash is quite faded by now as the truth comes out. Sempill had semi-official British crown sanction to commit his treason (from a strictly American point of view.), until about 1940, when the Americans find out about “the gentleman”. It is not until 1942 that the British muzzle him. He dies peacefully, unpunished, in 1956. Now one must recognize that the US is aware that the Japanese do British aviation type things the British way because the Americans Read Everybody’s Diplomatic Mail and the Americans can also compare what they see in the Pacific. The Americans have a ship that passes among the Japanese carriers exercising off Hokkaido as they practice for Blue RTL 1930 and the same thing happens for the British carriers exercising in the eastern Mediterranean in their anti-Italian wargames. Can one imagine “Bull” Reeves in 1931 when he reads about what is uncovered in his daily intel reports? How about Schofield or King? The USN leadership is not a happy bunch of sailors about what the evidence reveals. (Richardson, Turner, and Tower are other Anglophobes who can be explained by this all too real history, too.)
Re: Mister Hoover's Navy
9999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999
FLUFF: THE PLAN DOG IN EXECUTION.
American Order of Battle
TF 10.1 (26 ships)
R. Admiral Harry E. Yarnell (TF 10.1 Actual) Flagship USS Saratoga
Captain Ernest King USS Lexington
Captain Frederick J. Horne USS Saratoga
Captain Frank McCrary USS Cowpens
2 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 5 heavy destroyers
V. Admiral Joseph Mason "Bull" Reeves 10.1.1 flagship USS Maryland
USS Colorado
USS West Virginia
USS Washington
1 heavy cruiser, 3 light cruisers, 6 heavy destroyers
TF 10.2 (33 ships)
R. Admiral Henry Varnum Butler (TF 10.2 Actual) Flagship USS Yorktown
Captain George W. Steele USS Trenton
Captain Rufus F. Zogbaum USS Yorktown
Captain Frank A. Berrien USS Ticonderoga
2 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 5 heavy destroyers
R. Admiral Claude C. Bloch (10.2.1) Flagship USS California
USS Tennessee
USS Nevada
USS West Virginia
1 heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers, 4 heavy destroyers
Captain Chester Nimitz; Service Force TF 10.3 (Servforce Actual) (29 ships)
1 command ship, 10 fuel tankers, 4 ammunition ships, 5 stores ships, 1 hospital ship and 1 floating drydock.
2 light cruisers and 5 heavy destroyers
======================================
Subrons
TF 10.3 3 Type 171s, 2 Rs
TF 10.4 7 Type 171s, 4 Rs
TF 10.5 2 Type 171s, 2 Rs
TF 10.6 6 Type 171s, 6 Rs
29 Type 171s independent patrol
FLUFF: 連合艦隊を殺す OR FLAPJACKS FOR BREAKFAST? (Remember this is alternate universe, so names dates and people are extrapolated)
If Prince Fushimi Hiroyasu, who is awakened on October 15th 1931 at 0339.15 Local Tokyo time in the middle of the night by his hysterical batsman, had only spoken to one of his English instructors (1900-1903), especially to Roy V. Gaunt, RN who happens to be at Cadiz in 1898 when Mister McKinley’s navy comes calling in the form of the USS Char and sinks the Spanish armored cruiser, Maria Teresa , he would not be surprised at the news of the moment. That news is very confusing.
It seems that unknown flying machines have dropped parachute flares over Yokusuka, Sasebo, Kagoshima and Nagasaki, but curiously not over Kitsume, Hiroshima, Hakidate or Ormuru. The prince, who is the Imperial Japanese Navy’s chief of staff to that braindead idiot, Yamamoto Eisuke (4th Fleet Actual in American parlance) who is braindead precisely because he is a treaty treaty faction sell-out and traitor, roughly dismisses his batman and starts to work the only phone in the tunnel complex under Keio's Hiyoshi campus, south of Tokyo in Yokohama. The bunker complex is dug into the hill on which the college sits just because of this kind of eventuality that Fushimi Hiroyashu anticipated. He is a calm patient man this Prince Fushima; but even his phlegmatic patience is soon exhausted as he can get no answers after two hours of phone calls, from either Imperial General Headquarters (Prince Kan'in Kotohito is the incompetent in charge over there as Imperial Army chief of staff) in Tokyo or the Ministry of the Navy located opposite in its own building across the plaza. That person would be Minister Abo Kiyokazu, another dubious politician. Fushima fumes. He tries Sasebo direct by trunk landline. The only enemy who could possibly drop flares over Japanese cities would be the Americans. Though Fushimi’s brain registers this as a possible fact, he emotionally still does not believe it. Japanese spies in the Philippines have sent no reports of American zeppelins in the islands. And nothing else the Americans have can fly that far from any of their bases to appear this way over multiple Japanese cities in this fashion.
Someone at Sasebo naval base answers the phone. It is Captain Gengo Hyakutake. Although a treaty faction man, Fushima respects the man as at least being competent. He is destined to command 3rd Fleet when his current stint at the Maizuru Naval District is complete. Fushima listens to what Gengo tells him. It is a pattern that develops on Kyushu Gengo tells Fushima at least. A flight of 戦争の航空機 (4-8 military aircraft) approaches each harbor city from the landward side, using hills and flying low through valleys to hide the sound of their motors from the Japanese REDCAR acoustic mirrors and Yokohama trumpets, to suddenly pop up over the hills’ crest to an altitude of about 4000 meters to drop parachute flares, artificial magnesium torch suns which hang in the sky for up to four minutes. Immediately behind the flare droppers come two waves of attack planes, one wave which carries parachute retarded fragmentation bombs, and the other wave which carries torpedoes. The torpedo planes go after moored ships. The level bombers hit docksides, piers, warehouses and fuel storage. The damage is limited to the harbor areas for the attackers never number more than thirty planes total at any one time, but Sasebo, as an example, has been hit twice this night. Gengo concludes his report by stating; “The できそこない are as yet unidentified, but if they come again, we will see their third attack in daylight and know them.”
Fushima asks Gengo if any action has been taken to either organize a defense or send ships after the interlopers. The laugh at the other end of the surprisingly loud and clear phone line is a bitter one. “Typhoon 7 forced us to station most of 3rd Fleet to Kagoshima Bay. If our friends visit us there as thoroughly as they visit us here in Sasebo, I doubt we can send anything out to bother them.” It has not yet dawned on Fushima why Kichisaburō Nomura has not sent out warships to hunt for the fleet that must be the home for those enemy planes. Gengo has to explain it to him. “The ヤンキー野郎 have submarines, Fushima. They will be waiting for us to be stupid. The ラウンド目の野蛮悪魔 are very smart. We must be smarter.”
FLUFF: THE PLAN DOG IN EXECUTION.
American Order of Battle
TF 10.1 (26 ships)
R. Admiral Harry E. Yarnell (TF 10.1 Actual) Flagship USS Saratoga
Captain Ernest King USS Lexington
Captain Frederick J. Horne USS Saratoga
Captain Frank McCrary USS Cowpens
2 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 5 heavy destroyers
V. Admiral Joseph Mason "Bull" Reeves 10.1.1 flagship USS Maryland
USS Colorado
USS West Virginia
USS Washington
1 heavy cruiser, 3 light cruisers, 6 heavy destroyers
TF 10.2 (33 ships)
R. Admiral Henry Varnum Butler (TF 10.2 Actual) Flagship USS Yorktown
Captain George W. Steele USS Trenton
Captain Rufus F. Zogbaum USS Yorktown
Captain Frank A. Berrien USS Ticonderoga
2 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 5 heavy destroyers
R. Admiral Claude C. Bloch (10.2.1) Flagship USS California
USS Tennessee
USS Nevada
USS West Virginia
1 heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers, 4 heavy destroyers
Captain Chester Nimitz; Service Force TF 10.3 (Servforce Actual) (29 ships)
1 command ship, 10 fuel tankers, 4 ammunition ships, 5 stores ships, 1 hospital ship and 1 floating drydock.
2 light cruisers and 5 heavy destroyers
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Subrons
TF 10.3 3 Type 171s, 2 Rs
TF 10.4 7 Type 171s, 4 Rs
TF 10.5 2 Type 171s, 2 Rs
TF 10.6 6 Type 171s, 6 Rs
29 Type 171s independent patrol
FLUFF: 連合艦隊を殺す OR FLAPJACKS FOR BREAKFAST? (Remember this is alternate universe, so names dates and people are extrapolated)
If Prince Fushimi Hiroyasu, who is awakened on October 15th 1931 at 0339.15 Local Tokyo time in the middle of the night by his hysterical batsman, had only spoken to one of his English instructors (1900-1903), especially to Roy V. Gaunt, RN who happens to be at Cadiz in 1898 when Mister McKinley’s navy comes calling in the form of the USS Char and sinks the Spanish armored cruiser, Maria Teresa , he would not be surprised at the news of the moment. That news is very confusing.
It seems that unknown flying machines have dropped parachute flares over Yokusuka, Sasebo, Kagoshima and Nagasaki, but curiously not over Kitsume, Hiroshima, Hakidate or Ormuru. The prince, who is the Imperial Japanese Navy’s chief of staff to that braindead idiot, Yamamoto Eisuke (4th Fleet Actual in American parlance) who is braindead precisely because he is a treaty treaty faction sell-out and traitor, roughly dismisses his batman and starts to work the only phone in the tunnel complex under Keio's Hiyoshi campus, south of Tokyo in Yokohama. The bunker complex is dug into the hill on which the college sits just because of this kind of eventuality that Fushimi Hiroyashu anticipated. He is a calm patient man this Prince Fushima; but even his phlegmatic patience is soon exhausted as he can get no answers after two hours of phone calls, from either Imperial General Headquarters (Prince Kan'in Kotohito is the incompetent in charge over there as Imperial Army chief of staff) in Tokyo or the Ministry of the Navy located opposite in its own building across the plaza. That person would be Minister Abo Kiyokazu, another dubious politician. Fushima fumes. He tries Sasebo direct by trunk landline. The only enemy who could possibly drop flares over Japanese cities would be the Americans. Though Fushimi’s brain registers this as a possible fact, he emotionally still does not believe it. Japanese spies in the Philippines have sent no reports of American zeppelins in the islands. And nothing else the Americans have can fly that far from any of their bases to appear this way over multiple Japanese cities in this fashion.
Someone at Sasebo naval base answers the phone. It is Captain Gengo Hyakutake. Although a treaty faction man, Fushima respects the man as at least being competent. He is destined to command 3rd Fleet when his current stint at the Maizuru Naval District is complete. Fushima listens to what Gengo tells him. It is a pattern that develops on Kyushu Gengo tells Fushima at least. A flight of 戦争の航空機 (4-8 military aircraft) approaches each harbor city from the landward side, using hills and flying low through valleys to hide the sound of their motors from the Japanese REDCAR acoustic mirrors and Yokohama trumpets, to suddenly pop up over the hills’ crest to an altitude of about 4000 meters to drop parachute flares, artificial magnesium torch suns which hang in the sky for up to four minutes. Immediately behind the flare droppers come two waves of attack planes, one wave which carries parachute retarded fragmentation bombs, and the other wave which carries torpedoes. The torpedo planes go after moored ships. The level bombers hit docksides, piers, warehouses and fuel storage. The damage is limited to the harbor areas for the attackers never number more than thirty planes total at any one time, but Sasebo, as an example, has been hit twice this night. Gengo concludes his report by stating; “The できそこない are as yet unidentified, but if they come again, we will see their third attack in daylight and know them.”
Fushima asks Gengo if any action has been taken to either organize a defense or send ships after the interlopers. The laugh at the other end of the surprisingly loud and clear phone line is a bitter one. “Typhoon 7 forced us to station most of 3rd Fleet to Kagoshima Bay. If our friends visit us there as thoroughly as they visit us here in Sasebo, I doubt we can send anything out to bother them.” It has not yet dawned on Fushima why Kichisaburō Nomura has not sent out warships to hunt for the fleet that must be the home for those enemy planes. Gengo has to explain it to him. “The ヤンキー野郎 have submarines, Fushima. They will be waiting for us to be stupid. The ラウンド目の野蛮悪魔 are very smart. We must be smarter.”
Re: Mister Hoover's Navy
FLUFF: THE MAGIC DRAGON
About 1944 (RTL) Bell Laboratories, tasked by the USN to develop an electric power source for an electric torpedo that was more reliable than the lead acid battery types which with the Germans and now the US was familiar, came up with the magnesium/silver zinc seawater battery. It could be stored dry until a flow electrolyte was introduced over the cells. that would be seawater. The drawbacks of this system are two: heat degrades the battery storage shortening a 5 year shelf life to mere months and it is expensive. Copper instead of silver is cheaper, and aluminum (for the US) cheaper still, but the weight energy density issues are important factors. What does that mean? In 1930s terms and technology, it is the lead acid wet battery or nothing for an electric torpedo.
With that in mind, and the 21.67 by 216 inch torpedo size limitation (55 x 550 cm torpedo) more or less dictating the physical parameters and an electric motor limited to about 100 hp or 75 kw means the torpedo will run about 17 m/s for 250 seconds (33 knots for 4,650 yards.). The warhead of necessity will be limited to 200 kg (444 pounds of explosive.) to achieve that kind of performance. Negative buoyancy *(estimated fir thius hypothetical weapon will be about 300 kiliograms while the weapon overall will mass about ~1000 kilograms. Now to be certain of such a lightweight warhead bursting expected enemy ship torpedo defenses, the AU Americans at the time will use a TNT/Tetryl 70/30 mix. The reason is simple enough; though the bang is not much greater than a TNT warhead, the TNT/Tetryl composition can be molded into a shaped charge. In 1931 this does not by any means yield any kind of squash head or hollow charge derivative. It means that the Americans are able to cast explosive charges that will completely fill the nose of the torpedo and that can be set off by a standard shotgun shell initiator. Having searched the historical record, I have discovered no indication that RTL the US has profited from captured German WW I explosives research to the same extent as the UK, or France has prior to the Tizard Mission. Torpex, RDX and associated explosives will not become US common until WW II RTL. In effect, it is this 70/30 Composition P method or Explosive D for the US. Dunnite, the other name for Explosive D, or desensitized ammonium picrate as an “insensitive explosive” will be the common USN explosive filler until WW I and the access to British developments. In an AU where the British aree even more unhelpful, Dunnite will be the deal. The unfortunate side effect (besides a shortage of short grain newspaper pulp for US newspapers, will be for those on the receiving end of US heavyweight shells. US shells have to use a spinning clockwork safety gate base fuse initiator to set off the shell after it strikes and punches through a hard surface. For purposes of naval warfare, that means explosions after punching into the ship, not outside it. As for torpedoes, Dunnite is not a preferred explosive as its brisance in a water medium is not the best range to transmit shock. (~ 7000 m/s whereas 7,350 m/s is a bit too fast. But the USN does not know about aluminum powder’s effects until 1936.)
Fortunately for the AU USN, the RTL Japanese have a propensity (like the RTL Italians and the British) to overrate the effectiveness of their anti-torpedo schemes. The Japanese methods of fastening armor to Japanese built hulls also means that their warships have a vulnerable seam line between the armor belt and the torpedo void double bottoms they employ in their battleships, cruisers and aircraft carriers. This amplifies the effect of the rather puny US torpedoes. Hits that a blistered Queen Elizabeth (1934?) might shrug off, a Kongo (British built), a Tosa or a Nagato would succumb to easily and sink. It should be noted that the “zipper effect” so revealed; plus demoralized poorly trained personnel and an incompetent captain could result in a Yamato succumbing to such puny weapons. Shinano is the RTL case proof. That explains why three US torpedoes in the AU example (see above) can sink an otherwise robust Akagi.
For further jollies, the Mutsu catches fire and blows up when the R-raider (R-23) launched by the USS Barracuda penetrates Hashirajima Bay and torpedoes her and the Ise. Mutsu breaks in two. The Ise kisses sand in shallow water.
And the new week (Saturday) is only started...
PROBLEMS: NIGHT BOMBING, AIR DEFENSE AND SUBMARINE WARFARE.
Why are the Americans using low altitude night bombing under parachute flares and why do they use retarded fall bombs, which in effect are giant grenades? And why are they aiming at docks, warehouses, berths and storage facilities? If they are trying to Port Arthur the IJN, should not they attack... one supposes... ships?
Well... they are. The T3M and T4M torpedo planes are there to attack what moored ships they find. The level and dive bombers, a mixed force of carrier-based F4Bs (dropping flares) Curtiss SBCs (dive bombing point targets like the torpedo and munitions sheds at the eastern end of the Sasebo naval base) and seaplane Consolidated P2Ys (attacking from somewhere named Shangri La, more about that part of Plan Dog in a bit) attack area targets, such as railroad stations and terminals that support the naval bases and also airfields. It is quite a mess on the night of 15 October. But the attacks do not end with the hit and run air raids. Yarnell and Reeves do not forget their (AU Mister McKinley's Navy) Spanish American War history. The Cadiz and Ferrol Raids and the Cuba Blockade remain uppermost in their minds as does the Canary Islands Expedition. Submarines will play their part, and the Volcano Islands are earmarked for invasion.
Hoover wanted a police action? He gets more than what he bargained.